Bosnia’s Unhealed Wounds: Nationalisms on the Periphery

By Matias Wheeler Næss

It is impossible to understand Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and the Balkans today without understanding how Yugoslavia disintegrated. Bosnia remains hugely divided, and the same nationalisms that caused the war inspire modern Bosniak, Serb, and Croat movements for integration, separation, and even annexation. As Yugoslavia stagnated and dissolved, the West eagerly expected the new democratic nation-states to join their fold.[1] The Yugoslav idea had failed, and ultranationalists had made coexistence impossible. However, BiH, with its mixture of ethnoreligious nations, could not easily become independent or be partitioned without conflict, especially after democratic elections empowered nationalist parties. Even Bosniak leaders realized an independent Bosnia would become “inoperable.”[2] Yet, Bosnian independence was recognized, and fighting began. Planned and premeditated ethnic cleansing soon followed. The West and UN chose not to react even as civilians fled the advancing armies. The UN established ‘Safe Areas,’ but peacekeepers were not authorized to protect them. Only when thousands were massacred in Srebrenica did NATO decisively act, and quickly stopped Serb advances. Peace came but failed to reconcile the ethnic groups or establish true Bosnian statehood. Conflict is ever-present in BiH but remains frozen. That conflict was not inevitable, nor did it have to escalate as far as it did, except because of the choices of nationalists and the international community.

When war broke out in Croatia and Slovenia, few Bosnians expected the violence would affect them.[3] Ethnic parity was an assumed fact in Bosnia, which demanded all nations agree to significant constitutional change.[4] Though the region was divided between Muslim Bosniaks, Orthodox Serbs, and Catholic Croats, under Tito’s Yugoslavia, those from BiH were usually called Bosnian or Herzegovinian by regional rather than ethnic denomination.[5] Towards the end of the 1980s, this began to change.

In 1986, a memorandum of the Serbian Institute of Arts and Science was leaked which claimed Tito had culturally and economically repressed Serbs and compared Ustaše murders of WWII and actions by Albanians in autonomous Kosovo.[6] Slobodan Milošević, president of Serbia, and allies claimed genocide against Serbs was inevitable in a multinational state.[7] Serb nationalists claimed the only future for Serbs was in their own state.[8] When Milošević on this basis asserted Serb control of Vojvodina and Kosovo in 1989 Serbs and Montenegrins controlled half of Yugoslavia’s collective presidency. Many Croats and Slovenes no longer felt they could “pursue their republics’ interests within the federation.”[9]

In the elections of 1990, nationalist parties committed to independence won in Croatia and Slovenia.[10] In BiH, the vote was split along ethnic lines. Of the 240 seats of the Bosnian parliament, 86 were won by the Bosniak-led SDA, 72 by the Serb SDS, and 44 by the Croat HDZ.[11] A Bosniak, Alija Izetbegović, became president, while a Serb friend of Radovan Karadžić, leader of the SDS, became president of the parliament. Nationalist parties controlled most municipalities. Like the rest of Yugoslavia, Bosnia had been divided along national lines.

Bosnian Serbs “claimed they were threatened and victimized”[12] and wished to join a Greater Serbia including all Serbs. Bosnian Croats wanted to break away from Serb-dominated Yugoslavia and unite with Croatia. Chauvinistic nationalists on both sides did not want an independent BiH, but partition or outright annexation. Since Bosnia was largely intermixed, either outcome would lead to the disappearance or domination of the Bosniaks, who, therefore, felt they needed to strengthen their independent Muslim identity.[13] In 1991, Serb politicians announced the formation of Serb Autonomous Regions (SAOs), including the Autonomous Region of Krajina.[14] Serb leaders, including Karadžić and Milošević, said privately they were designed to undermine and intimidate the government of BiH and would be used to “destroy”[15]  the Bosnian state in any confrontation. After removing Bosnian state authority, they would form the base of Serb control. In a meeting with Milošević, Karadžić said he “would remove Bosniaks from Serb land when time and conditions permitted.”[16]

Despite this, Serb leaders attempted to convince Izetbegović and supporters to remain in rump Yugoslavia.[17] Milošević believed most Bosniaks would prefer a union; Karadžić did not think much would come of an agreement with the SDA and was committed to Serb separation. Bosniak leaders objected to staying within Milošević’s “corrupt Serb-nationalist” Yugoslavia,[18] so negotiations stalled.

The European Community (EC), seeking to end hostilities in the Balkans, declared “Yugoslavia is in the process of dissolution”[19] in November 1991. Citing the principle of self-determination, they allowed the Yugoslav constituent republics to declare independence. Contrary to Serb hopes, the same right did not extend to the Serbs in Bosnia.[20] If BiH declared independence, the Serbs would be left as a minority in Bosnia, so they attempted to block independence with the principle of national parity: no constitutional change without ethnic consensus. To Bosniak and Croat leaders, the EC declaration provided a final opportunity to leave Milošević’s Yugoslavia, so they voted to apply for recognition.[21] Serbs cast every opposing vote. The EC accepted the application but cited Serb opposition to independence, demonstrated by the establishment of the Bosnian Serb Assembly, the Serb plebiscite on remaining in Yugoslavia, and the declaration of the Republika Srpska (RS), and required a referendum on independence. None of those actions had any basis in the Bosnian or Yugoslav constitutions, nor were they sanctioned by the EC.[22] Since the referendum would not account for ethnic groups, its result was a foregone conclusion. This decision by the EC is strange since they recognized that Bosnia would not be able to control its territory nor have a consensus of its population, yet the EC required an action that would not achieve either.[23] Serbs would not be able to prevent international recognition, so they began preparing for war.

Having largely disarmed the multiethnic Territorial Defense (TO) increased the proportion of Serbs in the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), and sidelined non-Serb control of the army,[24] the JNA began arming Serb communities in BiH via the RAM plan.[25] Along with their JNA support, Serb paramilitaries would be better armed than their opponents for much of the war. A UN arms embargo made it difficult for Croats and Bosniaks to arm themselves, so they had to rely largely on the black market and support from Muslim countries respectively.[26]

The SDS developed a plan to create separate Serb institutions in municipalities, even those without Serb majorities, which could assume administration after the Serb military occupation.[27] Already speaking of the “disappearance of the Muslim nation,”[28] Karadžić was prepared for a war of conquest in Bosnia.

There were also attempts to peacefully partition BiH between Serbia and Croatia. In March 1991, in Karađorđevo, Vojvodina, presidents Milošević of Serbia and Franjo Tuđman of Croatia agreed that western Herzegovina and Posavina, two regions with Croat majorities, would join Croatia and the rest of Bosnia would join Serbia, ending BiH statehood to prevent war.[29] The agreement collapsed when the war began in Croatia, but Tuđman continued arguing for republics’ self-determination and territorial inviolability for Croatia, not Bosnia. Bosnian Serbs and Croats again agreed to partition BiH in May 1992, but the plan again failed.[30] Croats would fight independently until 1993 when they joined a Bosniak-Croat federation under US pressure to oppose RS together.

Though fighting had begun as early as 22 March,[31] EC recognition of Bosnian independence as the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina (RBiH), 6 April 1992, marks the formal beginning of the war.[32] Serb forces launched an offensive aimed to occupy 65% of Bosnian territory for the RS.[33] The siege of Sarajevo began in May.[34]By summer, RS would control two-thirds of BiH and began the ethnic cleansing of non-Serbs, including “massacres, rapes, torture, and deportations to concentration camps”,[35] especially of elites.[36] Bosniaks and Croats were expelled from previously mixed areas to make them easier to hold and ensure Serbs would become the majority.[37] An important question in the Bosnian war is how ethnic violence so quickly led to ethnic cleansing.

Western media as early as 1991 portrayed the conflicts in former Yugoslavia as “impossibly complicated, rooted in arcane ‘ancient ethnic hatreds’”,[38]implying that nothing could be done to prevent or stop it. This ignores the significant planning that preceded the conflict. Yugoslavia could have broken up peacefully, but Serb elites chose war to maintain their privilege. They convinced Serbs to imprison, rape, and murder their Bosniak neighbors to prevent an imagined “jihad”[39] and genocide against Serbs. Radovan Karadžić’s threats of Bosniak extinction were actively implemented in conquered areas to ensure that peaceful coexistence of the ethnic groups became impossible.[40] It was not a war between three ethnic groups doomed to hate one another but between conflicting nationalist views of what Bosnia was.

A second factor in the rapid turn to ethnic cleansing was the recent memory of interethnic violence. Memories of Ottoman domination and Ustaše murders during WWII were mobilized to inspire fear in Serb populations.[41] Violence occurred not against people, but “Turks.”[42] Offensives were presented as defensive in nature, meant to prevent a ‘jihad’ against the Serbs. Past traumas made violence a more acceptable option. Bosnia was polarized by ultranationalist leaders’ speeches, designed to generate and mobilize fear of one’s neighbors, which allowed other ultranationalist leaders to portray them as threats.[43] Fear of annihilation created a perceived need to pre-empt the other groups. In Bosnia, the Serbs acted first and were most prepared.

However, this leads to a misconception of the war in Bosnia as solely a Serb atrocity.[44] Though Serbs were responsible for the most crimes because they were more powerful and numerous and occupied significant non-Serb areas, Croats and Bosniaks each engaged in ethnic cleansing against other ethnic groups and operated concentration camps. The violence occurred between all three ethnic groups, and even within them, as extremists killed moderates or sacrificed members of their group for some “tactical or strategic aim.”[45] An estimated 10,000-12,000 women were raped during the war, sometimes ordered by low-level officers.[46]This occurred with the motives of imagined or mythologized revenge and humiliation, which the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) considered a tool of genocidal war. Some women were forced to bear children of other ethnicities as further humiliation. Violence against civilians was ubiquitous and something the international community failed to stop.

Before the war, the EC attempted to prevent bloodshed by partitioning Bosnia. In February and March 1992, Portuguese Foreign Minister Jose Cutileiro negotiated an agreement between Izetbegović, Karadžić, and Croat representatives to internally divide BiH into ethnoreligious entities called cantons.[47]The Cutileiro agreement would create a Bosnia that was not unitary; Serb negotiators had ensured it was never allowed “to be called a state”.[48] Therefore, the plan lacked the support of Bosniaks and would be reneged upon by Izetbegović.[49] Another agreement was reached in principle which would partition the country, giving Serbs 65% and Croats 20%. Bosniaks, 44% of the population, were offered just 15%. The agreement failed because Serbs and Croats could not agree on who would control Mostar. When the EC recognized Bosnian independence, they did so without guaranteeing that RBiH could survive as a multiethnic state.[50]

After the fighting began, the UN and EC failed to stop it because they were not committed to risking their own soldiers or the principle of international neutrality. Believing peacekeeping would not work in Bosnia, the UNSC committed to a policy of bare minimum action, seriously limiting the mandate of the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR).[51] Its first task in Bosnia was merely to keep the airport in Sarajevo open. Britain and France provided 9,000 troops, not because they wanted to fight Serbia, nor prevent violence against civilians, but to ensure they could control UNPROFOR. The UN Secretariat withheld and delayed vital information to prevent UN involvement in what Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali described as a “rich people’s war.”  Thus, peacekeepers lacked the mandate to prevent the establishment of concentration camps, nor to close them when they were exposed.  UNSC resolution 770 authorized member states to take “all measures necessary”[52] to “facilitate”, not ensure, delivery of relief supplies. Resolution 771 called on member states to report abuses of international law. This was not “a direct mandate for a coalition of the willing to liberate Serb-occupied Bosnia,”[53] but could be used to justify military action, which did not occur. Therefore, humanitarian aid could be stopped by a single combatant with a gun, and it frequently was.

The UN wanted to protect its principle of neutrality, which was crucial to protecting the lives of peacekeepers.[54] However, this effectively neutered peacekeepers, who could not use force to protect civilians. When Bosnian Vice Prime Minister Hakija Turajlić was murdered in front of his French escort, they did not respond, according to the letter of their mandate. Serbs would continue firing on the French in Sarajevo.  The shelling stopped when Danish troops responded to Serb shelling with a burst of fire from their tanks.[55] UN diplomats expected difficulties over the incident but were met with none. There were those in the UNSC who called for stronger mandates, notably Venezuelan and Bosnian ambassadors Arria and Sacirbey, but they were “marginalized”[56] and “outmaneuvered”[57] by the P5. Nowhere would the consequences of this be clearer than in Srebrenica.

Srebrenica, a majority Bosniak town in eastern Bosnia, was surrounded by Serb forces in January 1993.[58] Its population was bolstered by refugees from nearby captured towns. On the brink of humanitarian disaster, Srebrenica was visited by UNPROFOR commander General Morillon on 11 March 1993, when he declared “You are now under the protection of UN forces.”[59] Morillon had no authority to make that promise, so the UNSC scrambled to act. Ambassador Arria demanded a significant commitment of force to protect civilians, but British, French, and Russian representatives ensured only a weakly worded resolution would pass. Thus, the UNSC declared that Srebrenica “should”[60] be a “Safe Area.” If they had declared it ‘shall’ be a ‘protected area,’ UNPROFOR would have a mandate to use military force to protect the enclave, but that was not the intention. Instead, the resolution was “totally meaningless,”[61] and could be interpreted however the UN chose.

UNPROFOR negotiated a deal for Bosniak disarmament within the Safe Area in exchange for  a ceasefire and free access to humanitarian supplies.[62] Bosniaks were offered evacuation but would have been agreeing to an ethnic cleansing of themselves.[63] When Ambassador Arria visited Srebrenica, he discovered UNPROFOR was totally cooperating with the Serb besiegers.[64]Local command operated with direction from London and Paris, not the UN.

The siege continued until June 1995. Having already stopped supply shipments and raided the enclave, Serbs began directly shelling UN observation posts.[65] The local UN force of Dutch soldiers (Dutchbat) called for air support, but no one replied. Even in obvious self-defense, the UN would not agree to use military force to defend Srebrenica, because they did not believe the Serbs wanted to take the whole enclave. In July, the Serbs attacked and took peacekeepers hostage.[66] The UN threatened airstrikes if peacekeepers were attacked, but not if the town was captured. On 11 July, Srebrenica fell; NATO dropped only two bombs to prevent the fall, but it was too little too late.[67] Dutchbat, women, children, and elderly men fled. Peacekeepers were disarmed, and the men of Srebrenica were put on buses to the fields where they would be killed.[68] Approximately 8,000 were massacred on the orders of Ratko Mladić, Radovan Karadžić, and Slobodan Milošević.[69]

When news of the massacre reached Washington and Paris, NATO began moving quickly.[70] The requirement for UN approval of airstrikes was abolished and the UN withdrew to leave no hostages. Operation Deliberate Force lasted between 30 August and 20 September, consisting of 3,500 sorties to destroy the Serb ability to keep fighting.[71] Serbs promised to retaliate but never did. The international community had failed to end the war in three years, but NATO did so in one month with no fatalities, based on a UNSC resolution from 1993. The war formally ended two months later with a peace accord in Dayton, Ohio.

The Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) were signed under enormous international pressure after Bosniak and Croat forces began advancing.[72] They divided BiH into two entities, a Bosniak-Croat Federation, formerly RBiH, and the RS, controlling 51% and 49% of Bosnian territory respectively. DPA accepted Serb ethnic cleansing to prevent violent retaliation by Bosniaks and Croats. Previously mixed areas became ethnically homogenous[73] and RS became a quasi-independent Serb nation-state.[74] Only a “thin roof”[75] of shared institutions was left of an integral Bosnian state. The right to return to ethnically cleansed areas was included in DPA, but no domestic institutions were created able to enforce it.[76]RS would veto attempts at reform. This division of BiH makes it difficult to redevelop a shared ‘Bosnianness’[77] and prevents reconciliation. International presence after DPA did not focus on individual human rights and oversaw the completion of ethnic cleansing, when those left on the “’wrong’ side”[78] of the boundary line left their homes. Ethnically homogenous enclaves became obstacles to future return. Those in BiH committed to a secular Bosnia-Herzegovina of equal citizens are becoming fewer and less enthusiastic as separation seems more permanent.[79] Bosniaks tend to support reintegration, while Serbs and Croats remained skeptical, supported by leaders who still dream of unity with Serbia or Croatia. Even today, those parties responsible for the war continue to be prevalent in politics.[80] At least in these respects, ethnic cleansing was successful in BiH.

Should the ethnic cleansing of Bosnia be considered genocide? The answer depends on definition and interpretation. The International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) estimates the death toll at 25,000-329,000, 50% Bosniaks, 30-35% Serbs, and 15-20% Croats.[81] According to the ICTY, genocide did occur in Bosnia, but only in Srebrenica in 1995.[82] Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić were convicted of genocide and aiding and abetting genocide in Srebrenica.[83]Slobodan Milošević likely would have been but he died before his judgment.[84] Other instances were deemed only ethnic cleansing, because the goal arguably was to create Greater Serbia or Greater Croatia, not by exterminating Bosniaks, but by expelling them. Normally only men between 16-and 60 and elites[85] were targeted for internment and murder, so it could be argued the goal was a military occupation, which removes the intent necessary for genocide. Only in Srebrenica was there an attempt to kill all men, hence the distinction. This may satisfy a legal definition of genocide, but ethnic cleansing did create large areas where Bosniaks became “physically and biologically extinct.” [86] Expulsion is effectively genocide when the expelled have nowhere to go. 900,000-1,200,00 Bosnians of all ethnicities became international refugees while 1,500,000 were internally displaced, 50% of them Bosniaks.[87] When civilian and military leaders of Serb forces were found guilty of genocide in Srebrenica specifically, but dissimilar actions led to similar results elsewhere, the claim that a genocide occurred in Bosnia at large is justified, regardless of an intent to exterminate, as the European Court of Human Rights ruled.[88]

Care should be taken to remember crimes by Bosniaks and Croats, between each other and against Serbs,[89] often ignored in the West for political reasons. Serbs were responsible for most crimes and the most serious atrocities, but Bosniaks and Croats also engaged in ethnic cleansing, war crimes, and possibly genocide. Narratives that ignore this distort and oversimplify the complexity of the war and compromise the potential for justice.

The war in BiH is likely the best covered by media in history.[90]Atrocities and ethnic cleansing were daily news as the UN failed to act to protect civilians while actively keeping victims from buying arms in self-defense. Using justifications based on total misunderstandings of the region, significant actors chose not to get involved in a conflict they could have ended with little cost to themselves. Nationalist leaders used memories of foreign domination and violence to stoke fears of total annihilation with the goal of making coexistence impossible. History was mythologized and weaponized to imagine a future of homogenous nation-states where those would be impossible without the destruction of entire nationalities. The EC rushed to recognize Bosnian independence with no reasonable expectation it could occur peacefully and did little to aid victims of ethnic cleansing after the war began. Serb leaders had planned a policy of ethnic cleansing which culminated in the genocide of Srebrenica, the deadliest mass killing in Europe since WWII. Where they advanced, Bosniaks and Croats also engaged in significant crimes. The war ended in the legitimization of the Serb separatist RS and accepted Serb jurisdiction in the areas they ethnically cleansed and failed to reconcile the ethnic groups. To this day, some nationalists still entertain dreams of secession. Bosnians, Croatians, and Serbians continue to see the war as one of “ethnic survival and national independence,”[91] ultimately as necessary.

In Bosnia, three very similar peoples were led to believe they could not continue to live alongside each other. They were misled by their politicians and failed by the international community. They murdered and were murdered. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina shows how dangerous nationalisms can be when mobilized in mixed populations with memories of violence. It was not an accident, but the result of intentional efforts to make coexistence impossible. With that as their goal, the nationalists succeeded.

[1]Veremis, Thanos. A Modern History of the Balkans: Nationalism and Identity in Southeast Europe. London / New York: I.B.Tauris, 2017. 85-6.

[2]Veremis, Thanos. 2017. 91.

[3]Glenny, Misha. The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War. 3rd ed. New York: Penguin Group, 1996. 139.

[4]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 141.

[5]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 143.

[6]Weitz, Eric D. A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015. 195-6.

[7]Weitz, Eric D. 2015. 198.

[8]Weitz, Eric D. 2015.199.

[9]Weitz, Eric D. 2015. 210.

[10]Weitz, Eric D. 2015. 210.

[11]Donia, Robert J. Radovan Karadžić: Architect of the Bosnian Genocide. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015. 118.

[12]Mojzes, Paul. Balkan Genocides: Holocaust and Ethnic Cleansing in the Twentieth Century. Plymouth, UK: Rowman & Littlefield, 2011. 164-5.

[13]Mojzes, Paul 2011. 165.

[14] Donia, Robert J. 2015. 142-3.

[15] Donia, Robert J. 2015. 143.

[16] Donia, Robert J. 2015. 148.

[17] Donia, Robert J. 2015. 153-5.

[18]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 155.

[19]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 239.

[20]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 239-40.

[21]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 241-2.

[22]This was decided by the Bosnian constitutional court, which only had an advisory role. Actual action would have to be taken by the Bosnian parliament, but this never occurred. (Donia, Robert J. 2015. 112.)

[23]Veremis, Thanos. 2017. 85.

[24]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 164-6.

[25]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 150-1.

[26]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 170.

[27]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 231-233.

[28]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 166.

[29]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 149-50.

[30]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 168.

[31]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 167.

[32]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 170.

[33]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 170.

[34]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 170.

[35]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 170.

[36]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 188.

[37]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 172.

[38]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 24-5.

[39]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 170.

[40]Hoare, Marko Attila. “Towards an Explanation for the Bosnian Genocide of 1992-1995.” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 14, no. 3 (2014) & Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 172-3.

[41]Weitz, Eric D. 2015. 198.

[42] LeBor, Adam. 2008. 122.

[43]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 192.

[44]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 173.

[45]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 177.

[46] Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 184-6.

[47] Donia, Robert J. 2015. 263-4 & Glenny, Misha. 1996. 192.

[48]Donia, Robert J. 2015. 264.

[49]Glenny, Misha. 1996. 192-4.

[50]Veremis, Thanos. 2017. 86.

[51]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 31-3.

[52]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 34.

[53]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 34.

[54]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 34-5.

[55]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 65-6.

[56]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 35-6.

[57]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 40.

[58]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 37.

[59]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 39-41.

[60]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 40-1.

[61]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 41.

[62]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 41-3.

[63]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 179.

[64]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 42-3.

[65]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 93-5.

[66]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 99-100.

[67]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 104-5.

[68]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 110-1.

[69]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 181.

[70]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 129.

[71]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 129.

[72]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 171.

[73]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 190.

[74]Kofman, Daniel. “Self-Determination in a Multiethnic State: Bosnians, Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs.” In Reconstructing Multiethnic Societies: The Case of Bosni-Herzegovina, 1st ed. London: Routledge, 2001. 31.

[75]Belloni, Roberto. State Building and International Intervention in Bosnia. Security and Governance Series. New York: Routledge, 2007. 17.

[76]Lippman, Peter. Surviving the Peace. Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt University Press, 2019. 35.

[77]Belloni, Roberto. 2007. 42.

[78]Belloni, Roberto. 2007. 23.

[79]Lippman, Peter. 2019. 35-6.

[80] Lippman, Peter. 2019. 377-8.

[81] Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 187.

[82] Vukušić, Iva. “Archives of Mass Violence: Understanding and Using ICTY Trial Records.” Südost-Europa 70, no. 4 (2022). 588.

[83]International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia. “Trial Judgement Summary for Ratko Mladić.” ICTY, November 22, 2017. https://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdfhttps://www.icty.org/x/cases/mladic/tjug/en/171122-summary-en.pdf. & “Trial Judgement Summary for Radovan Karadžić.” ICTY, March 24, 2016. https://www.icty.org/x/cases/karadzic/tjug/en/160324_judgement_summary.pdf.

[84]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 190-1.

[85]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 188.

[86]Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 190.

[87] Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 187.

[88] Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 189.

[89] Mojzes, Paul. 2011. 193.

[90]LeBor, Adam. 2008. 114.

[91]Veremis, Thanos. 2017. 92.

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